This paper studies the impact of both solvency and liquidity concerns on corporate …nance. The …rm optimally chooses capital structure, cash holdings, dividends and default while facing stochastic cash ‡ows with two sources of uncertainty. The expected cash ‡ows are uncertain and low pro…tability leads to solvency distress. Moreover, cash ‡ows are subject to liquidity shocks that cause liquidity distress. Our extension of the contingent claims trade-o¤ model with liquidity concerns o¤ers a wide range of implications for corporate …nance. The model provides a rationale for signi…cant corporate cash reserves and produces a dynamic cash policy that is in line with empirical regularities. The optimal dividend distributions are smoothed relative to cash ‡ows. Furthermore, we characterize a set of predictions on the relationship between cash holdings, dividends, leverage, and credit spreads.
Introduction
Three central areas of corporate …nance are the choices of capital structure, payout to equity and cash holdings level. This paper's principle contribution is the integration of the three instruments in a contingent claims model. In particular, we present an intertemporal model for valuation of corporate equity and debt and characterize these values together with the optimal cash holdings, dividends and default in closed form.
We build on the contingent claims models of risky asset valuation introduced by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) . Since Leland (1994) , an important strand of the literature focused primarily on corporate …nance implications of contingent claims modeling with the central role given to the optimal choice of capital structure. The standard CentER, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000LE Tilburg, The Netherlands; E-mail: s.gryglewicz@uvt.nl. that, in the presence of …nancing constraints, the …rm cannot cover its debt obligations due to liquidity distress. Davydenko (2007) reports that close to 10% of the defaulting …rms are economically solvent but face liquidity distress (with a caveat that the number might be underestimated due to the default costs biasing the asset value downwards), and concludes that "[neither solvency nor liquidity concerns] alone can fully explain observed default decisions".
In order to tackle these de…ciencies we design a model in which both insolvency and illiquidity may cause default on debt payments. To construct a corporate environment suitable for our purpose the model must have two characteristics. First, we must allow for …nancing constraints. A …nancially unconstrained …rm will be able to raise external equity …nancing whenever it remains solvable (Leland (1994) ). Thus the assumption of …nancing constraints is a prerequisite to the relevance of liquidity distress. Second, we suppose that the cash ‡ow process has two sources of uncertainty. First, instantaneous cash ‡ows are subject to liquidity shocks. Second, the expected instantaneous cash ‡ow is uncertain. Speci…cally, with respect to the uncertain expected ‡ows, we assume that the expectation about the future cash ‡ows (we refer to the expectation as the profitability) evolves in time as the parties observe cash ‡ow realizations and learn about the …rm's true pro…tability. This learning process re ‡ects the fact that persistent negative (positive) liquidity shocks translate into decreased (increased) solvency. The …rst source of uncertainty captures short-term liquidity distress. The second source of uncertainty is behind long-term …nancial distress that eventually may lead to insolvency. We note that with cash ‡ows characterized by uncertain pro…tability but without liquidity shocks, as it is modeled in the standard framework of Leland (1994) , the instantaneous cash ‡ows are predictable and liquidity management becomes trivial. Contrarily, cash ‡ows with liquidity shocks but with a …xed expected ‡ow leave no room for solvency distress and solvency default.
As it turns out in our model, introducing …nancing constraints and liquidity concerns creates very plausible endogenous cash holding and dividend policies. Without cash reserves the …rm very soon becomes illiquid and is forced into default while still being solvent. This default is ine¢ cient, as it would never have happened without …nancing constraints. We characterize a (variable) cash level, denoted by M , that allows the …rm to withstand liquidity shocks up to the point where the equity holders endogenously trigger solvency default. We show that over time M evolves over time and increases with the expected pro…tability. Intuitively, a more pro…table …rm is more solvent and thus requires a larger bu¤er of cash to withstand more signi…cant liquidity shocks before it eventually is declared insolvent. Consistently with empirical evidence, the endogenous cash holdings serve as a bu¤er to absorb losses and as a means to avoid ine¢ cient default (Opler et al. (1999) , Lins, Servaes and Tufano (2007) ).
We show that it is optimal for the …rm that maximizes equity value to retain all earnings if cash is below M , and subsequently to pay out dividends that allow the …rm to maintain cash at (evolving) M . The optimal dividend policy implied by our model is particularly notable. As in corporate practise, endogenous dividend ‡ows are smooth in comparison with cash ‡ows or earnings (preview Figure 3 for an illustration).
The smoothing mechanism is explained as follows. We note …rst that with a constant target level of cash reserves, dividend ‡ows are tied to earning shocks. With cash at the target level, positive earnings are fully distributed and negative earnings lead to dividend omission. It is di¤erent in our model. Suppose that the …rm realizes surprising positive earnings. The …rm that generates high cash ‡ows is valued more (the expected value of instantaneous cash ‡ow increases) and thus it requires more cash to cushion liquidity shocks before it becomes insolvent. Consequently, surprising positive earnings lead to an increase in the optimal cash holdings that require more earnings to be retained instead of distributed to equity. In case of surprising low earnings, the expectation of future cash ‡ows decreases and so does the …rm's valuation. Thus the …rm becomes less solvent and the cash reserves needed to fend o¤ liquidity distress before insolvency decrease. As a result, some cash is released and distributed to equity complementing lower earnings. Both positive and negative earning shocks are smoothed out.
Another notable feature of our model is that the extension with liquidity concerns reduces the dispersion of the predicted credit spreads. This e¤ect addresses the key problem with the predictive power of structural models as documented by Eom, Helwege and Huang (2004) . The empirical study of Eom et al. (2004) indicates that the available structural models predict too high credit spreads in case of the relatively high spreads and too low spreads if the predicted spreads are relatively low. In other words, the predicted spreads are too dispersed. The reason that our model predicts less dispersed credit spreads is explained as follows. The …nancially constrained …rm needs to raise the initial cash from external …nancing. We show that the exposure to liquidity distress and the initial cash reserves are the lowest for the intermediate coupon levels. This is because with increasing coupon rates the …rm is more in risk of solvency default and the relative role of liquidity concerns decreases. But on the other hand, high coupon payments impose a burden on cash ‡ows, increase liquidity risk and the optimal cash reserves. If external …nancing is subject to the proportional issuance cost, then the …rm that minimizes this cost will tend to gravitate to the intermediate coupon levels that minimize the amount of needed cash. Therefore, with liquidity concerns and costly issuance, we observe less dispersion in the predicted optimal coupons which translates into lower dispersion of credit spreads across …rms.
Our analysis indicates also that short-term cash ‡ow volatility and long-term uncertainty about …rm's economic prospects may have very di¤erent e¤ects on …nancial variables. We show, for example, that cash holdings increase in short-term volatility and decrease in the magnitude of long-term uncertainty. Credit spreads decrease in shortterm volatility and the opposite e¤ect is found with increasing long-term uncertainty.
The two sources of uncertainty exhibit di¤erent e¤ects because, essentially, short-term volatility is related with liquidity concerns and long-term uncertainty with solvency concerns.
We …nd that optimal leverage ratios in our model decrease relative to the benchmark model without liquidity concerns. This is a desirable feature as the standard model has been criticized for predicting excessive leverage. The main force behind the e¤ect is the inclusion of endogenous cash holdings. Higher cash levels tend to decrease default risk and thus increase debt value. But it is the equity that is the direct claimant of cash, and thus marginal cash is accounted directly in equity value. Consequently, cash holdings increase the denominator of the leverage ratio (…rm value) more than its numerator (debt value).
In the context of the structural models literature, our paper is the …rst to simultaneously incorporate liquidity and solvency default, and to o¤er closed form solutions. Acharya, Huang, Subrahmanyam and Sundaram (2006) introduce cash holdings into a discrete-time numerical model of risky debt and focuses on the role of strategic debt renegotiation. In another numerically-oriented paper, Hennessy and Whited (2005) feature cash management alongside dynamic leverage, while focusing on the e¤ects of taxation.
Apart from the literature on contingent claims valuation of risky debt, the present paper relates to one more strand of literature, namely on dynamic liquidity management and dividend payout optimization. Jeanblanc-Picqué and Shiryaev (1995) study a tractable model of a …nancially constrained …rm threatened by costly liquidation. The optimal payout policy is to retain all earnings if cash reserves are below a certain …xed threshold and to pay out everything otherwise. The model has been extended to incorporate, among others, investment and costly …nancing , Løkka and Zervos (2008) , Décamps, Mariotti, Rochet and Villeneuve (2007) ). Remarkably, the literature that aims at modeling dividends did not succeed so far in producing a model of realistic dividends as observed in corporate practice. In particular, it failed at demonstrating why …rms smooth dividend payouts. Our paper contributes to this literature by showing that adding uncertainty in the expected value of cash ‡ow and solvency concerns leads the optimizing …rm to smooth dividends over cash ‡ows.
Our paper is also related to the recent work of DeMarzo and Sannikov (2007) . In their model an agent controls the expected cash ‡ows of the …rm by exercising costly e¤ort and the initially-unknown expected pro…tability is learned over time. They show that the principle/investor can implement the optimal contract through a payout policy that is smoothed relative to cash ‡ows. Both models share the prediction of smooth dividends and the assumption of cash ‡ows that are characterized by uncertain expectations and that are also subject to unpredictable shocks. The papers di¤er as the results of DeMarzo and Sannikov (2007) built on the principle-agent con ‡ict and focus mainly on the payout policy, whereas our results follow from the trade-o¤ arguments. Moreover, our paper covers a broader area of corporate …nance beyond payout policy (debt coupon, taxes, bankruptcy cost, ‡otation cost) and, while building on the standard contingent claims analysis, may be more suitable for the valuation of corporate securities and the analysis of credit risk. When taken together, the two papers imply that the two sources of uncertainty in cash ‡ows may produce smooth dividends in di¤erent modeling setups. 1 The next section sets up the model. In Section 3 we analyze the benchmark case of the …rm without …nancing constraints and concerned only about solvency. Section 4 presents the main model with both liquidity and solvency concerns. In Section 5 we discuss the impact of liquidity concerns on corporate …nance and derive a set of empirical predictions. Section 6 concludes, and the Appendix collects the proofs omitted in the main text.
Setup

Outline and timing
The management behaves in the interest of equity holders. All investors are risk neutral and discount cash ‡ows at a constant risk-free rate r. The model is set in continuous time with in…nite horizon, indexed with t 2 [0; 1):
The original equity holders are …nancially constrained and seek external …nancing to cover investment cost I and initial cash reserves M 0 . The investment cannot be delayed.
Once successfully …nanced the …rm generates a continuous ‡ow of earnings. Cumulative earnings at time t are denoted X t . The earnings process is the main state variable and is described in detail in the next subsection. Earnings are subject to corporate taxes at rate with full loss o¤set provision. The debt coupon payments are deducted from earnings for tax purposes creating the tax bene…t of debt.
The …nancing may come from a combination of equity and perpetual debt that promises ‡ow coupon c. The value function of equity is denoted E and that of debt is D. We allow for both …xed and proportional ‡otation costs of new issuance, denoted L 0 and 2 [0; 1) respectively. For simplicity the costs are the same for both debt and equity.
The sequence of the events and decisions is as follows. At time t = 0 the …rm issues a combination of equity and debt to maximize the value of the original equity holders.
After that the …rm starts receiving the ‡ow of earnings, pays out the promised coupon and corporate taxes. Net pro…ts (or losses) are left at the disposal of the …rm and are either retained to increase (decrease) cash reserves or paid out to equity holders as dividends (in case of instantaneous losses dividends may be paid out from positive cash reserves). Cumulative dividends up to time t are denoted by Div t . 2 To deal e¤ectively with the indeterminate situations, we assume that equity holders pay out marginal cash holdings whenever they weakly prefer so. Alternatively, with a slight increase of analytical burden, we could have assumed a (small) cost of holding cash in the …rm (due to taxes or agency costs, for example) so that any cash not needed in the …rm is paid out.
When the …rm has no means to cover the current coupon payments it defaults due to liquidity reasons. We call such an event a liquidity default. The …nancial distress is driven here by short-term factors. The …rm may also, acting in the interest of equity holders, voluntarily default if the value of equity falls below zero. In this case the …rm is not pro…table enough for the equity holders to run it and pay the debt coupons. The …rm faces then a long-term distress and we refer to this type of default as a solvency default.
In the event of either type of default the …rm is liquidated. The liquidation is costly.
The debt claims have the absolute priority in case of default and the liquidation value is A; 2 (0; 1). Here 1 is the proportional liquidation cost and A is the value of the all-equity …rm at the moment of default. 3
Earnings and uncertainty
The …rm generates a stochastic ‡ow of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT)
is the mean of EBIT, is its volatility and Z is a standard Brownian motion. All parties (insiders and outsiders) have the same information at each time t. They observe the cumulative EBIT process fX s ; s tg that generates a …ltration fF t g. There are two sources of uncertainty. First, instantaneous ‡ows are subject to Brownian shocks dZ t . These represent short-term liquidity shocks. Second, the pro…tability of the …rm is uncertain, which is represented by the fact that the true mean is ex ante unknown to all parties. We impose that is …xed and can take either of the two values L or H ; with L < H : All parties share a common prior expectation 0 about , with
The two sources of uncertainty serve to capture the two main sides of corporate …nancial distress. The unpredictable immediate earnings (due to Brownian shocks) bring in the short-term liquidity risk. The uncertain drift puts the …rm into position to undergo solvency distress and ultimately a solvency default.
As time evolves, more information becomes available and the parties update their expectation of the mean earnings. The current set of information generated by X t is described by F t and it is used in a Bayesian fashion to update the conditional expectation
We can use the optimal …ltering theory to …nd the law of motion of the posterior expectation variable. Let us introduce an innovation process Z as the di¤erence between the realized and expected earnings and de…ned by the di¤erential equation:
The process Z is a Brownian motion adapted to …ltration F t . Note that Z di¤ers from Z (which is not observable by the parties and not adapted to F t ). Equation (2) describes the dynamics of X in terms of observables.
A version of Theorem 9.1 in Liptser and Shiryaev (2001) then yields that the posterior expectation of the mean earnings level evolves as
Note …rst that the posterior expectation process is a martingale as it incorporates all predictable information. Secondly, the volatility of is inversely related to re ‡ecting the fact that the expectations adjust more rapidly if the noise term in the earnings process is small (the earnings signals are informative). Finally, the learning slows down as evidence accumulates in favor of one state and is close to either L or H .
Relation with existing literature
The main framework of our model closely follows the standard in the literature on contingent claims modeling of capital structure based on the trade-o¤ theory. The distinguishing feature of the present model is the speci…cation of the cash ‡ow process in (1), which with the use of the …ltering theory can be rewritten into (2) and (3).
The motivation for our modeling choice is three-fold. The …rst two reasons stem from the need to expand and connect the two strands of literature related to our analysis. First, cash ‡ows in our speci…cation are subject to unpredictable liquidity shocks to introduce non-trivial cash and dividend policy. This is like in liquidity management models that analyze optimal dividend policy and predict precautionary cash reserves that cushion liquidity shocks (Jeanblanc-Picqué and Shiryaev (1995) ). Technically, cumulative cash ‡ows are modeled here as a stochastic process following an arithmetic Brownian motion. As a result, instantaneous cash ‡ows are increments of the process and are subject to Brownian shocks. 4 In contrast, the structural default literature typically models instantaneous cash ‡ows as the level of a geometric Brownian motion. In this case, cash ‡ows are predictable and the liquidity management becomes trivial.
Second, we also allow for the drift of the arithmetic Brownian motion to be uncertain to enable endogenous solvency default. In the models based on a simple arithmetic Brownian motion with a constant drift, the expected pro…tability is constant and, given …xed debt obligations, the …rm is always solvent (or insolvent) erasing the endogenous default from the model. With our assumption the …rm may become insolvent, in the sense that it is not pro…table enough for equity holders to cover its debt obligations (as in Leland (1994) , Leland and Toft (1996) and others).
Third, the assumption of cash ‡ows following the stochastic di¤erential equation (1) is analytically convenient. Speci…cally, we obtain closed-form solutions for corporate securities values, optimal cash reserves, dividends and default threshold. The same stochastic environment has been successfully adapted in di¤erent contexts by Moscarini (2005) to study job matching in labor markets and Keppo, Moscarini, and Smith (2008) to analyze the value of and demand for information.
Solvency default without liquidity concerns
For the sake of comparison we start with a benchmark. Following the framework introduced by Leland (1994) we assume in this section that the …rm is not subject to liquidity constraints. The endogenous default is triggered by the equity holders when equity value becomes negative. The equity holders are willing and able to inject any necessary funds to keep operations running whenever the equity value is positive. Following Leland (1994) the secondary equity …nancing proceeds are not subject to ‡otation costs.
As in numerous contingent claims models of capital structure, a closed-form solution is available under the simplifying assumption that debt is issued only once at the initial date (Leland (1994) , Leland and Toft (1996) , Fan and Sundaresan (2000) , Du¢ e and
Lando (2001), Miao (2005) , Hackbarth et al. (2007) , Sundaresan and Wang (2007) ). 5 Accordingly, we assume that:
Assumption 1 New debt …nancing is constrained to time t = 0.
Assumption 2 Equity …nancing is costless beyond t = 0.
Under these assumptions the …rm is without liquidity concerns and there is no room for cash holdings as any liquidity needs can be covered by an injection of equity …nancing.
We use subscript u with the value functions in this section to denote the …nancially unconstrained case. For brevity, we suppress the dependence of the value functions on other parameters except for , but most notably they also depend on coupon c.
We …rst consider the value of the …rm if it was …nanced fully by equity. If we assume that L 0; 6 then the …rm is always pro…table and its value is simply equal to the expected discounted future after-tax cash ‡ows:
The liquidation value that the debt holders receive in the event of default is A u ( ) with 1 representing the proportional liquidation cost.
At the next step we …nd the values of the claims held by the debt and equity holders.
These values depend on the ‡ows to the claimants and default time. The optimal default time, chosen by the equity holders, is the …rst time the expected pro…tability falls to some threshold u .
The …rm issues perpetual debt that pays a constant continuous coupon at rate c per unit of time. It then follows from the standard arguments and Ito's lemma that before default debt value D u satis…es the following ordinary Bellman-type di¤erential equation
subject to
This system states that if the …rm is not in default, the required rate of return on the debt equals the sum of the coupon ‡ow and the expected increase in the value of debt. 5 In an alternative and more complex setup Goldstein et al. (2001) allow for upward leverage adjustments. 6 The alternative assumption that L < 0 would introduce the optimal liquidation of the …rm even in the absence of debt …nancing. In this case, Au( ) equals the expected discounted future after-tax cash ‡ows up to the liquidation time, which is optimally chosen by the equity holders. We omit this minor extension which brings little to our model, while slightly raising the complexity of expressions.
At u the …rm defaults and the debt is valued at A u ( u ): The boundary condition at H ; which is an absorbing state for ; asserts that D u is bounded and equal to the risk-free value.
At each period t before default, the equity receives the expected ‡ow of (1 ) ( t c),
which is the expected free cash ‡ows after taxes and coupon payments. As in general u < c (we con…rm it below in (8)), this means that non-negative dividends are expected as long as t c and that in periods with t < c the equity receives "negative dividends" in expectation. The negative distributions are typically interpreted in this type of models as equity issuances. Unrealistically and inconsistently with evidence on costly equity issuance, this implies that the …rm resorts to external …nancing very frequent and especially so when close to default. 7 We address this issue in our main model in Section 4.
Within the setting of this section, the equity value E u must satisfy the following di¤erential equation:
This di¤erential equation and the boundary conditions can be interpreted similarly to the ones for debt valuation.
Having de…ned equity and debt values we can calculate total levered …rm value F u that, by de…nition, equals the sum of equity and debt. We have that
The equity holders choose the default trigger ex post, that is after the initial …nanc-ing. It means that they maximize equity value E u over u . This is equivalent to setting the smooth pasting condition on E u ( ) at u :
The condition requires that the optimal value function is smooth at the default trigger, and indeed it can be shown that it corresponds to the …rst order condition from maximization of E u ( ) with respect to u :
The optimal capital structure is determined at the issuance point with the choice of coupon c that maximizes the value of the initial equity holders (to indicate directly the dependence on c we add it as a parameter to the value functions in the reminder of this section). The …rm seeks to …nance the investment cost I. The …nancing comes from debt and new equity. If the new equity holders obtain a fraction of equity and the proportional and …xed issuance costs are and L then the following …nancing identity
which can be rewritten as
The left hand side represents the value of the initial equity holders. Hence, maximization of the left hand side is equivalent to maximization of E u ( ; c) + D u ( ; c). Then it follows using (6) that the optimal choice of coupon c (and thus of the initial leverage) by the initial equity holders is equivalent to maximization of F u ( 0 ; c):
We summarize the …ndings of this section in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and L 0. The optimal solvency default is characterized by the …rst time is at or below u given by
If u ; the values of equity E u ( ), debt D u ( ), and total …rm F u ( ) are given by
and
where
The optimal coupon rate c maximizes F u ( 0 ) over c.
The closed-form expressions for the value functions are interpreted as follows. The value of equity (9) is the sum of the present value of perpetual distributions to equity and the present value of cash ‡ows lost at default. The value of risky debt in (10) consists of two terms. The …rst term, c=r, is the value of risk-free perpetual debt. The second term re ‡ects the impact of default risk and equals the present value of cash ‡ows lost by debt in case of default. Total …rm value (11) consists of three elements: the …rst one is the present value of the perpetual ‡ow of net earnings, the second is the present value of the tax bene…ts of debt, and …nally the negative term corrects for the present value of the cash ‡ows lost at default.
Equation (8) implies that in general u < c (see also the discussion below Proposition 5 and Figure 2 ). This means that, as in other structural default models following Leland (1994) , the equity holders expect negative cash ‡ows when close to default yet they prefer to keep the …rm running. Moreover, it is worth noting that neither the proportional ‡otation cost nor the …xed one L in ‡uences the optimal choice of c.
Model with liquidity concerns
Following the standard in the related literature, in the previous section we assumed that, after the initial issuance, equity can be issued frequently and costlessly and that the debt ‡otation costs (or other implicit concerns) prohibit debt re-issuance. Empirical evidence clearly indicates the opposite: the issuance costs of debt, both …x and variable costs, are signi…cantly lower than those of equity (Altinkiliç and Hansen (2000) , Leary and Roberts (2005) ). Leary and Roberts (2005) further document that new equity is issued less frequently than debt. Clearly, the assumption of the benchmark model, that new equity serves to cover current coupon payments in case of insu¢ cient earnings, is di¢ cult to reconcile with this evidence.
To address this issue in a tractable way, we restrict the …rm's access to external …nance. After the initial issuance, which is subject to …xed and proportional costs, the …rm cannot raise additional capital. This simplifying assumption, which facilitates the analysis with closed-form solutions, can be justi…ed by the …xed issuance cost and also by the same convention that excludes secondary debt issuance in numerous contingent claims models of capital structure (see the references above Assumption 1). For further reference we state that:
Assumption 3 New external …nancing is constrained to time t = 0.
As in the benchmark case, debt holders'claims have absolute priority over the productive assets in case of default. However now the …rm shall also hold liquid nonproductive assets, namely cash reserves, and we assume that these are distributed to equity just before default. We abstract from possible contracts that may limit such distributions as they are not central to our paper. 8 This assumption simpli…es the analysis and moreover, as we show below, in most cases the optimizing …rm reaches the endogenous trigger with zero cash holdings.
Cash and dividend policy
At each time before default the …rm generates stochastic EBIT dX t and pays out taxdeductible debt coupon cdt. The dynamics of earnings net of taxes and debt obligations, denoted by Y t ; is thus
Without cash reserves and with …nancing constraints, the …rm becomes illiquid and is forced into default as soon as dX t < cdt: Positive cash reserves in our model serve as means to decrease liquidity risk. Let us denote cash reserves at time t by M t . Cash reserves change at each time by the instantaneous interest earned on current cash holdings and the di¤erence between net earnings and dividend payout:
In general, the higher M t the lesser is the risk of liquidity distress. Of special interest is the level of cash holdings that allows the …rm to avoid liquidity default altogether.
The next proposition characterizes this level of cash reserves.
Proposition 2 Let M be the lowest level of cash reserves that allows the …rm to avoid liquidity default under Assumption 3. M ( ) is given by
The proof, given in the Appendix, relies on the requirement that the dividend process Div t is non-decreasing. This requirement implies a set of ordinary di¤erential equations
and (15) is the minimal solution satisfying these equations. 9
Before interpreting the expression for M in (15) we …rst determine the dividend stream that is implied by the cash policy M t = M ( t ). First, by Ito's lemma the 8 In any case, such covenants may be di¢ cult to enforce as the equity holders would try to preempt with the distributions. 9 An alternative and instructive way to see the result is to think of Mt as the level of cash that is su¢ cient to withstand a shock in Zt that brings t to (irrespective of how quickly the shock is realized). For brevity, we focus here on the case of c 1 2
where Zt Z is the shock that brings t to default trigger . To characterize Zt Z let us
Then using (14) and (17) we obtain that if M t = M ( t ) the dividend stream is given by
Note that with (15) we can write dDiv t as a function of t only and not directly of M t .
Equation (15) implies that M increases with and decreases with . This is because if the current is closer to default at , the liquidity shocks to be absorbed by cash before endogenous solvency default become smaller. The e¤ect of the coupon rate on cash holdings is two-fold. The main e¤ect works for all levels of c indirectly via .
A higher c means earlier default or, equivalently, higher (see (29) 
As M is the lowest level of cash reserves that allows the …rm to avoid liquidity default, it is not surprising that M = 0 as reaches in case c is not too large
; then high coupon payments require positive cash holdings at all times before default. Note that the additional term in (15)
, makes the dividend rate in (18) equal to zero at default.
Suppose that the divided-cash policy aims at decreasing risk of liquidity default.
We later verify that this is indeed optimal if the …rm's objective is to maximize equity and only if t = ). Applying Ito's lemma to t we have
This equation holds in particular also for t 0 = . So the shock that brings t to (and also t to ) is Zt Z = ( t ). It follows that our candidate M ( t) must satisfy
which con…rms (15) in the proposition for the case c 1 2
To obtain the additional term in (15) one must impose the condition that the implied dividend payout is nonnegative for all t > (which is not the case under (16) 
If the cash level is at M ( t ), the payout policy is such that this level is maintained as t ‡uctuates. This is, according to (18):
If the cash level exceeds M ( t ), the residual is paid out:
Before proving that this cash-dividend policy is optimal for equity holders, we demonstrate an intuitive property of optimal equity value that states that the partial derivative of the optimal equity value E( ; M ) with respect to M is larger than or equal to one.
This is intuitive as any extra cash holdings can be paid out immediately as dividends and then the optimal dividend policy followed again. To see it note that for any cash level M equity value E( ; M ) of the …rm following the optimal dividend policy must be at least equal to the sum of optimal equity value with M M cash, E( ; M M );
and M in a dividend payout: E( ; M ) E( ; M M ) + M . After rearranging the inequality and letting M go to zero, we obtain that
We can state the following about the dividend policy.
Proposition 3 The payout policy (19)- (21) maximizes equity value.
Intuitively, the proposed payout policy is optimal as it directs retaining all cash ‡ows whenever marginal cash holdings decrease probability of illiquidity (so that cash withheld in the …rm is worth more than its face value, E M ( ; M ) > 1) and paying out excess cash ‡ows otherwise (when marginal cash holdings in the …rm are equal their face value, E M ( ; M ) = 1).
Valuation of corporate securities
The values of corporate securities depend on numerous factors and among them also on the initial cash level …nanced by external investors. To obtain closed-form solutions we assume that the …rm issues securities su¢ cient to cover cash holdings M ( 0 ) that allow the …rm to avoid liquidity risk.
Note that this assumption is partially validated by Assumption 3, the main assumption of the model, which constrains availability of external …nancing to the initial date.
Without additional external …nancing all the required cash is raised with the initial issuance. 10 If M 0 = M ( 0 ) then by Proposition 3 the optimal dividend policy is given in (20) for all t > . This payout policy implies that M t = M ( t ) for all t > . In other words, under Assumption 4 the …rm holds cash reserves at the level M ( t ) until the endogenous solvency default and is hedged against liquidity risk.
Under our assumptions, debt value D equals the present value of continuous coupon payments up to default time as soon as t reaches . D( ) must satisfy the following di¤erential equation
At default debt holders receive a fraction of the EBIT-generating technology. That is, following the earlier literature, we simplify on the …nancing issues after default. This implies that the debt holders recover at default A( ), where
Thus the di¤erential equation for D is coupled with the following boundary conditions:
With the assumptions of the present model, up to default at the …rst time t falls to ; the equity receives the ‡ow of dividends equal to
Then it follows from the standard arguments that equity value E must satisfy the ordinary di¤erential equation:
subject to the following boundary conditions:
As usual, the left-hand side of (23) re ‡ects the required rate of return per unit of time for holding equity. The right-hand side represents the expected change in equity value plus the dividend ‡ow per unit of time. The boundary condition at is in line with the assumption that the equity holders withdraw non-productive liquid assets prior to default. The boundary condition at H ensures that E( H ) M ( H ) is bounded and equal to the risk-free value of free cash ‡ows.
Solving the respective di¤erential equations with the boundary conditions we obtain closed-form solutions for both equity and debt values. The following proposition reports these results.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. Then for a given and debt and equity value satisfy
with given in (12).
Equation (25) implies that, for a given coupon c and default trigger ; the debt value is the same as in the benchmark case reported in equation (10). This is not surprising as the liquidity risk in the present model is e¤ectively hedged by appropriate cash holdings. Nevertheless liquidity concerns may a¤ect optimal coupon and default and thus indirectly alter debt value.
Combining (9) and (26) reveals that equity value equals E u ( )+M ( ); that is equity value of the …rm without liquidity constraints given in (9) plus the cash stock. By holding cash reserves M ( ) the …rm is hedged against liquidity distress and thus the value of its productive assets is equal to those of the …nancially unconstrained …rm. In addition, the equity holders hold the full rights to the cash holdings (which they nevertheless prefer to retain in the …rm) and thus M ( ) augments their value. The cash in the …rm M ( ) is worth exactly M ( ) to the equity holders as the interest gained on cash equals the investors'discount rate (cash can be seen as a zero net present value investment).
By de…nition, the levered …rm value equals the sum of equity value and debt value.
From Proposition 4 we obtain that if L 0 it holds that
Equation (27) demonstrates that …rm value is a sum of four components. It consists of the face value of cash holdings plus the present value of earnings net of taxes plus the present value of tax shield of debt minus the probability-adjusted present value of cash ‡ows lost at default. Using (6), F ( ) can be written as F u ( ) + M ( ). That is, the levered …rm with liquidity concerns and with cash holdings that hedge liquidity risk equals the value of the …rm without liquidity concerns plus the face value of cash.
Default and optimal capital structure
Under Assumptions 3 and 4, the …rm uses cash reserves to cushion liquidity shocks.
Then the timing of default is endogenously selected by equity holders. Default takes place at the moment that the …rm is not solvent enough. The default policy takes the form of a lower threshold on that maximizes equity value. This is achieved at that satis…es the smooth pasting condition:
(Compare it with the smooth pasting condition (7) and the boundary condition for E at = (24) in the present model.)
The initial equity holders using new equity and debt seek to …nance the investment cost I and the initial level of cash reserves M ( 0 ; c) (to stress the dependence on c we add parameter c to cash and value functions in the rest of this section). If the new equity holders obtain a fraction of equity and the proportional cost of issuance of both debt and equity is and the …xed cost of issuance is L then the following …nancing identity holds:
This can be rewritten as
The left hand side represents the value to the initial equity holders. It follows that the optimal c that maximizes (1 ) E( 0 ; c); also maximizes the right hands side, and the objective function can be expressed as (30) in the next proposition. In the same proposition we also present the solution to the smooth pasting condition (28) for the optimal default trigger.
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions 2 and 3 the optimal solvency default is characterized by the …rst time is at or below given by
The optimal coupon rate c maximizes
over c. and coupon represents the value of waiting to default. Due to this value, the equity holders prefer to keep the …rm running despite the fact that the coupon obligations exceed the expected earnings.
As illustrated in Figure 2 , default triggers increase in : By Equation (12) depends on the earnings signal quality (that is and H L ) and the discount rate. It follows that the default trigger increases with the noisiness of the earnings signals (higher or smaller H L ) and with the level of discount rate r. Intuitively, with noisy signals and high r the value of postponing default in order to wait for new information decreases. in equation (29) is the same as u in the benchmark case reported in (8). Since the …rm is e¤ectively hedged against liquidity distress, it makes sense that the solvency default trigger that maximizes equity value is the same as for the …nancially unconstrained …rm. Interestingly, this is despite the precautionary cash reserves that need to be held in the …rm. However, the isomorphism of and u means only that the default policy in both cases is the same if coupon obligations are the same. The second part of Proposition 5 implies that in general the optimal coupons di¤er in the two cases with and without liquidity concerns.
Using (27), the objective function (30) can be rewritten as
Comparing this objective function with the one of the …nancially unconstrained …rm (which was F u ( 0 ; c)), we note the major di¤erence between the cases. Whereas the coupon choice in the benchmark analysis was independent of any issuance cost, the optimal coupon of the constrained …rm is dependent on the proportional issuance cost . This is because now the capital structure choice interferes with the …rm's …nancing needs: the …rm needs to raise capital to cover the initial cash holdings and the required initial level of cash depends on the coupon rate itself. As raising additional units of cash is costly due to the variable issuance cost, the …rm's optimal choice of c takes into account also its impact on the initial amount of cash to be raised. Recall from Figure 1 that M is decreasing in c for low levels of c and increasing for high c. It follows that to minimize the ‡otation cost of raising the initial cash reserves, the contained …rm issues more debt than the unconstrained …rm if the unconstrained …rm's optimal coupon is relatively low (below ( L + H )=2). The opposite happens if the unconstrained …rm's optimal coupon is high and above ( L + H )=2.
We note that in the absence of …nancing frictions in the sense of zero variable cost of issuance ( = 0), the objective function simpli…es to F u ( 0 ; c) and is exactly equivalent to the problem in the case without liquidity constraints. Moreover, the …xed cost of issuance does not matter for the choice of optimal c.
Impact of liquidity concerns on corporate …nance
In this section we analyze the implications of our model with liquidity concerns along two dimensions. First, we discuss the main di¤erences between the standard trade-o¤ model and our model with both solvency and liquidity concerns. Second, we examine a set of empirical implications of the extended model. 
Cash holdings
The structural models of capital structure and credit risk following Leland (1994) have typically assumed away a meaningful cash policy. As in our benchmark analysis in Section 3, the equity holders are assumed to have no …nancial constraints and equity issuance is costless. Consequently, any necessary funds are provided by new equity issuance as long as the equity holders are willing to continue operating the …rm. This leaves the cash policy irrelevant.
In contrast, our model predicts a non-trivial role for cash holdings. The …rm holds a positive amount of cash to meet debt coupon payments in case these obligations exceed current earnings. In other words, with costly external …nancing, cash reserves serve as a cushion to prevent short-term liquidity distress. Our model further speci…es that cash reserves are not meant to cover any losses. If the …rm persistently generates losses for a longer time period, the (expected) pro…tability decreases and ultimately the …rm becomes insolvent. As a result, the optimal policy prescribes cash holdings (the target level of cash is given by equation (15)) that are a function of the expected earnings and are su¢ cient to cover liquidity shocks up to the point of endogenous default. 11
It is worth noting that the cash ratio de…ned as cash holdings divided by total …rm value that is implied by our model is in line with cash holdings observed among U.S.
…rms. With our base case parameters, the cash ratio equals 20:6%. This value is similar to the average cash ratio of 23:2% documented for a sample of U.S. …rms in 2006 in Bates et al. (2007) .
The model predicts that cash holdings of …nancially constrained …rms are strongly correlated with cash ‡ows (compare (17) and (2)), while cash holdings of unconstrained …rms are not systematically related with cash ‡ows. This implication provides an alternative interpretation of the evidence of Almeida et al. (2004) showing the same pattern of cash ‡ow sensitivity of cash. Almeida et al. (2004) explain their …ndings and precautionary cash holdings by the …rms' need to fund future investments while facing …nancing constraints. In contrast, in our fully-dynamic model the constrained …rm uses positive cash ‡ows to build up cash (and uses cash to cover negative cash ‡ows) in order to avoid ine¢ cient default in the future. Our interpretation seems more in line with the empirical evidence in the study of Opler et al. (1999) that cash holdings serve mainly 1 1 The characteristics of the optimal cash policy seem to closely re ‡ect the corporate practice. Based on an extensive survey among international CFOs, Lins et al. (2007) conclude:
[S]trategic cash serves a basic function -to provide a general purpose bu¤er against future cash shortfalls. CFOs state that this is the primary driver of strategic cash holdings -with its importance ranking far exceeding that of other response choices. Thus, it appears that …rms use strategic cash to insure against all types of negative shocks to cash ‡ows, rather than to just fund growth when external capital may not be available. This …nding positions strategic cash holdings as a form of …nancial distress (or bankruptcy) insurance.
to cover losses (and not capital expenditures or payouts to equity holders).
The empirical literature has been interested in the impact of debt on corporate cash holdings treating the former variable as exogenous. Figure 1 presents the cash level M as a function of coupon c and shows that cash decreases in debt for low and moderate levels of debt and increases with high levels of debt. The empirical evidence of Opler et al. (1999) documents a negative relationship between cash and leverage. A more re…ned study of Guney, Ozkan and Ozkan (2007) provides evidence for a similar non-monotonic relationship between cash holdings and debt. Our model implies that such correlations may be expected from the data but it also suggests caution when interpreting the evidence and inferring any causal relationship as both cash stock and debt level are endogenous and variations are driven by changes in exogenous variables.
Another relationship of interest is the impact of cash ‡ow volatility on cash holdings.
Equation (15) for the target cash stock of the constrained …rm reveals that, ceteris paribus, higher volatility of EBIT induces higher optimal cash holdings. In our model this is because larger cash reserves are required to hedge against more volatile cash ‡ows.
This prediction is consistent with the empirical …ndings of Opler et al. (1999) and Han and Qiu (2007) .
Our model predicts that the marginal value of cash holdings to equity holders di¤ers across …rms. In particular, the model is able to encompass all the main hypotheses of the recent empirical study of Faulkender and Wang (2006) . Recall that the marginal value of cash is equal to one for unconstrained …rms and for constrained …rms at or above the target cash level M . The marginal value of cash in constrained …rms with cash below M exceeds one, re ‡ecting the decreasing probability of liquidity default with an additional unit of cash. It is clear that the marginal value of cash is larger for constrained …rms and that it decreases in the level of cash holdings. Most interestingly, we can derive a clear interpretation of the empirically observed negative cross-sectional relationship between the marginal value of cash and debt level (Faulkender and Wang (2006) seem to build their hypothesis and interpretation on the contingent claims models that do not have a meaningful cash policy). For small and moderate levels of debt, the comparative static exercise presented in Figure 1 reveals that the target level of cash decreases in debt. Then for a …xed cash level below M an increase in debt implies that the current cash holdings are closer to M so the …rm is closer to be fully hedged against liquidity shocks.
Consequently, the marginal value of cash decreases in debt. Our model predicts also an untested possibility that the relationship reverses for high levels of debt.
Smooth dividends
The standard structural trade-o¤ models of capital structure treat dividends simply as a balancing item: any residual cash ‡ows are paid out to equity holders. This leads to a dividend pattern that bears little resemblance to actual corporate payout decisions.
As in our benchmark case in Section 3, in these models the implied payouts in each period constitute 100% of positive free cash ‡ows and dividends are omitted in periods of negative free cash ‡ows.
Our model, being extended by liquidity concerns, predicts a very di¤erent optimal payout policy. When the cash reserves are at the target level M ( ); the level that prevents liquidity default, the optimal dividend payout is given by (20). This dividend payout allows the …rm to maintain cash reserves at M ( ) with changing . From (20) we observe that in each period dividend payouts are not only non-negative for , which is by nature the case for corporate dividends, but also that the instantaneous payout is predictable. The latter fact is due to the absence of the Brownian shock in (20). This is in contrast to the dynamics of net earnings in (13), which apart from the time drift component include also a Brownian motion term. This implies that net earnings are more volatile than dividends. In other words, the model predicts that dividends are smoothed relative to earnings. This prediction is in line with persistent evidence on corporate dividend payout practice (Lintner (1956) , Brav et al. (2005) ). This smoothing feature of our models is driven by the interplay of liquidity and solvency default and the role of cash holdings as a cushion against liquidity shocks.
The mechanism can be described as follows. Positive earnings shocks that bring in disposable cash ‡ows also increase the expected pro…tability. The more pro…table …rm is more valuable and thus it requires more cash reserves to fend o¤ liquidity distress before declaring solvency default. In other words, dividends are ‡attened in case of high earnings, because an increase in cash ‡ows is o¤set by the increasing optimal cash reserves. In case of surprisingly low earnings, the expected pro…tability decreases, the …rm gets closer to endogenous solvency default and the cash level that allows the …rm to avoid liquidity distress decreases. Consequently, low earnings lead to a release of some of the cash holdings that are paid out to equity. Both positive and negative earnings surprises are smoothed out and, as Figure 3 demonstrates, our model predicts positive and stable dividends even if earnings are very volatile.
Another feature of our endogenous dividend policy that …nd support in empirical evidence is the prediction that …rms in distress would rather reduce dividends but do not omit them. This kind of payout activity of distressed …rms is documented by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990).
Issuance cost
Propositions 1 and 5 imply that the issuance costs have no role in choice of the optimal capital structure of the unconstrained …rm (at least if the costs are uniform for all types of …nancing), and that the proportional issuance cost a¤ects the optimal capital structure in the case of …nancing constraints and liquidity concerns. As explained before, matters, because the funds to be raised from external investors, that is the investment cost and the initial cash I + M , depend on the structure of the …nancing via M .
The role of in determining the optimal coupon and thus the optimal capital structure is illustrated in Figure 4 . We plot four curves of optimal coupon c in varying initial level of expected EBIT 0 ; each curve represents a di¤erent level of . The dotted line depicts the case of = 0. As usual, higher cash ‡ows allow the …rm to take more debt and c strictly increases in 0 . With a positive , the …rm takes into account how much cash it requires to hedge liquidity risk. As M is the lowest at c = 1 2 ( H + L ) (see Figure 1) , the minimization of the total issuance cost causes the optimal choice of c to gravitate towards 1 2 ( H + L ). Consequently, we observe that for relatively low (high) coupon payments of the unconstrained …rm, …nancing constraints increase (decrease) the optimal coupon. The e¤ect is stronger with higher . This example reveals that The proportional issuance cost has a important implication for corporate credit spreads. Credit spread are de…ned by the di¤erence between the debt yield and the risk-free rate, c=D r. Because in the case of …nancing constraints and issuance cost the optimal coupons are ‡attened, we may expect that these factors contribute to a decreased dispersion of credit spreads when compared to the …nancially unconstrained case. This e¤ect allows us to address the key problem with the predictive power of structural models as reported by Eom et al. (2004) . Eom et al. (2004) test the yield spread predictions of several structural models and conclude that the available models tend to produce a too high dispersion of predicted credit spreads. Where the structural models predict high credit spreads, these predictions largely exceed the actual spreads, and where the models predict low credit spreads these predictions fall signi…cantly below the observed ones. Our model with liquidity concerns moves the predicted credit spreads in the desired direction. We point out this decreased dispersion of credit spread in the following two subsections when we calculate the spreads for various parameter values.
EBIT volatility
Increasing EBIT volatility has two main direct e¤ects on the endogenous variables.
First, it increases the magnitude of liquidity shocks and thus the liquidity risk. Second, it makes the instantaneous cash ‡ows less informative about the true pro…tability .
Less informative signals lead to an increase in due to a lower value of waiting with the decision to default (see Figure 2 ). Figure 5 .A reveals that the issuance cost has a signi…cant e¤ect on the optimal coupon when liquidity concerns matter. The unconstrained …rm reduces the optimal coupon c u in increasing ; because of higher default risk. The situation of the constrained …rm is di¤erent, as it has to raise funds also for the initial cash reserves, and the target cash level M is the lowest for intermediate coupon rates (see Figure 1) . Hence, while minimizing the issuance cost, the …rm's optimal coupon c is driven towards the mean (see also Figure 4 and Section
5.3).
This behavior of the optimal coupon also explains the di¤erence in debt values for the constrained and unconstrained …rm ( Figure 5 .B). Whereas the unconstrained …rm's debt value decreases in ; the opposite occurs for the …rm without liquidity concerns.
It shows that in the case with liquidity concerns the positive e¤ect of maintaining a relatively high and stable coupon dominates other e¤ects that increase default trigger and decrease debt value.
The plot in Figure 5 .D presenting the leverage ratio reveals that, despite the differences in debt values, the leverage ratio decreases in both cases. This is in accord with the empirical evidence on leverage (Titman and Wessels (1988) ). In the case of the constrained …rm, the decreasing leverage is the result of the increase in equity value exceeding the decrease in debt value (see Figure 5 .C). The forces that push the equity value up in are, …rst, the well-known call-option characteristics of equity (equity bene…ts from positive shocks and has an option to default in case of negative shocks) and, second, the increase in cash holdings. Due to larger liquidity risk in increasing cash ‡ow volatility, optimal cash holdings increase in as shown in Figure 5 .E. This prediction is consistent with the empirical evidence documented by Bates et al. (2007) . Our analysis con…rms that the explanation in Bates et al. (2007) , i.e. that the recent spectacular expansion in cash holdings among U.S. …rms is to a large degree due to the increasing riskiness of cash ‡ows, has a theoretical grounding in a model with endogenous cash and …nancing. Figure 5 .F shows that in the case of …nancing constraints and issuance cost the predicted credit spreads are less dispersed than in the case of no …nancing constraints.
As discussed in Section 5.3, this e¤ect is due to the ‡attening of the optimal coupon and may improve the predictive power for credit spreads of the existing structural models that cash ‡ow uncertainty may be the exogenous variable responsible for the similar regularities found in empirical studies (Opler et al. (1999) , Acharya et al. (2007) ). .A reveals that the unconstrained …rm increases the optimal coupon with rising H L . This is the result of a lower default risk stemming from a decrease in . The rising c u causes the debt value to increase in H L (Figure 6 .B). It turns out that the equity value does not bene…t from the increased pro…t potential as this gain is o¤set by higher coupon payments (in Figure 6 .C, the equity value of the unconstrained …rm slowly decreases in H L ). The situation is di¤erent for the constrained …rm. The driving force is the necessity to raise initial cash subject to the issuance costs. As before, the required cash is the lowest for intermediate coupons, so the minimization of the ‡otation costs causes c to be driven to the intermediate values (the solid line in 6.A). When c u of the unconstrained …rm is relatively low (here for low H L ), the …nancing constraints move the optimal coupon upwards. In such a case, the debt value increases and the equity value decreases. When c u and c are already relatively high, the …nancing constraints prevent c from growing in H L , which leads to a decrease in the debt value and an increase in the equity value. The e¤ects on the debt and equity values are depicted in Figures 6.B and 6 .C.
Pro…tability uncertainty
The forces just described aggregate in Figure 6 .D in the a non-monotonic leverage ratio in H L in the case of constrained …rm; …rst rising and then falling. The rising region in marked by low debt coupons and the region of falling leverage is characterized by relatively high coupon payments. For the unconstrained …rm the pro…tability uncer- Notably, the e¤ects just described lead to a negative relation between cash and credit risk. This means that the relationship preserves the same sign as in the case corresponding to uncertainty (cf. Figure 5) .
The relationship between cash and leverage is non-monotonic if the underlying changing exogenous variable is the uncertainty about pro…tability.
Our analysis draws attention to the need of di¤erentiation between short term volatility in cash ‡ows and long-term uncertainty about economic prospects. It would be interesting to operationalize these measures of uncertainty and empirically test the predictions of our model.
Leverage
A weakness of the standard trade-o¤ model of capital structure that has been frequently raised in the literature, is that the optimal leverage implied by the model exceeds the leverage ratios observed in empirical studies. Our model lessens this problem. It is best revealed in Figures 5 and 6 . The second plots on the right hand side in both …gures present leverage ratios for various parameters. The consistent pattern is that the leverage ratio of the …rm with liquidity concerns is signi…cantly below the ratio of the unconstrained …rm. While there are a number of e¤ects that liquidity concerns bring to capital structure, the driving force behind the remarkably reduced leverage is the recognition of the role of cash in corporate assets. As the total assets of the constrained …rm incorporate the value of cash, the leverage ratio decreases.
Conclusions
Earlier literature has studied in separation either solvency default with optimal capital structure or liquidity default with cash and dividend policy. Our analytically tractable framework allows to study a combination of the two sources of …nancial distress and to enhance understanding of the interaction of …nancing, cash, and dividends. With an extension to liquidity concerns our setting addresses some of the weaknesses of the existing contingent claims models of corporate …nance.
We believe that future research can use our model to study a number of additional issues. In order to stay reasonably focused we have concentrated on the analytically most tractable scenario under the assumption that the …rm fully hedges the liquidity risk from the initial date. We leave it for future research to analyze the case of cash reserves below the target level M . In this case the …rm may actually default because of either solvency or liquidity distress. We note here that such an analysis, by adding liquidity-driven default, may present a potential to alleviate the recognized problem of the structural models based on solvency default, that is the underprediction of credit spreads and default probabilities for shorter horizons. It would be also interesting to extend our analysis and allow for di¤erent degrees of …nancing constraints. In such an extension the …rm would be able to raise new external …nancing beyond initial date, but this …nancing would be subject to issuance costs. Finally, future research may incorporate investment into the model to study the joint role of debt and cash in …nancing capital expansion in the presence of …nancing constraints.
A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We …rst solve for the equity value function. Di¤erential equation (5) has an analytical solution of the following general form:
where > 1 is the positive root of
and B 1 , B 2 are constants that are determined by boundary conditions. (32) can be veri…ed by direct substitution. The …rst two terms constitute the general solution to the homogenous part of (5) and the third term is an easy-to-guess particular solution to the whole non-homogenous equation (5). The boundary condition at H implies that B 2 = 0: This is because with > 1 for any other B 2 ; E u ( H ) is unbounded. Using the boundary condition at u to determine B 1 delivers the expression for E u ( ) given in the proposition.
Debt value is found analogously using that the general solution to di¤erential equation (4) is
with as above and constants B 3 and B 4 : Applying the boundary conditions on D u at H and u yields (10). Firm value F u given in (11) follows by adding (9) and (10). Optimal default trigger u in (8) is delivered by applying the smooth pasting condition (7) to (9).
Proof of Proposition 2. For an arbitrary function M ( ; ), let M t = M ( t ; X t ) so that M t is allowed to depend on both state variables. Denote the default time associated with trigger by t = inf ft 0 : t < g. The …rm is liquid up to time t if M t 0 for all t t . Note that, for example, a simple cash policy M t = 0; t t ; satis…es this liquidity condition, but such a policy is infeasible as it requires negative dividends.
From (14) we have
The cash and dividend policy is feasible if the equality holds at each time. As the …rm has a full discretion over non-negative dividends, the cash policy remains feasible as long as dDiv t 0 in (33). We want to determine the lowest cash level M that satis…es both liquidity and feasibility conditions.
Suppose …rst that M ( ; X) is a continuous and di¤erentiable function. Applying
Ito's lemma to M , the right hand side of (33) can be written as
where subindexes at M denote partial derivatives. Our requirement that increments of this process are non-negative for all t t ; can be satis…ed if only if, …rstly, the volatility coe¢ cient at dZ t is constant and zero and, secondly, the drift parameter at dt is non-negative. The …rst condition yields the following partial di¤erential equation
Its general solution is
where C 1 and C 2 are constants. As X t ; t t ; can in general take any positive or negative values, the liquidity condition M t 0; t t ; is satis…ed only if C 1 = 0.
This means that M is independent of X. To determine C 2 we use the non-negativity condition on the drift parameter in (34), which with the use of (36) can be written as
We note that M is increasing in ; which implies that the inequality is most demanding at = : Moreover, the liquidity condition at all t t requires that M ( ; X) 0:
Solving the two last inequalities for the constant C 2 we obtain the formula given in the proposition.
Finally we rule out that there are points of discontinuity and non-di¤erentiability in M if > . If M is discontinuous, it can only have downward jumps. But if M immediately after the jump is the smallest M that allows the …rm to avoid liquidity default, then in a continuous environment M could not be the smallest one satisfying the desired property. Hence M must be continuous. Suppose now that M has some non-di¤erentiable points. In between the points M must satisfy di¤erential equation (35) with the general solution in (36) subject to boundary conditions implied by the continuity of M . But with C 1 = 0; it will result in M that is a continuous di¤erentiable function of for all > .
Proof of Proposition 3. For a given de…ne the value function E( ; M ) as follows.
For > and 0 < M < M ( ); E( ; M ) satis…es the di¤erential equation
For and M M ( ) E( ; M ) is given by
For if and M = 0 E( ; 0) = 0
To prove that the policy speci…ed in (19)- (21) 
and in the last equality we use (37) if 0 < M < M ( ) or (38) combined with (5) if
M M ( ).
Note that W t is a martingale if (1 E M ( t ; M t )) dDiv t equals 0. As E M ( t ; M t ) 1 if M t < M ( t ) (by (22)) and E M ( t ; M t ) = 1 if M t M ( t ) (by 38), the policy proposed in (19)-(21) guarantees that W t is a martingale. This implies that the value that is obtained by the equity holders from the dividend distribution speci…ed in (19)- (21) where the second equality holds because W t is a martingale.
For any other feasible payout policy it must hold that dDiv t 0 and E M ( t ; M t ) 1.
It follows that the drift of W t ; (1 E M ( t ; M t )) dDiv t ; is non-positive and thus W t is a supermartingale. Consequently
so the present value of dividend payouts in this alternative policy is less than or at most equal to E( 0 ; M 0 ):
There are no jumps in Div t for t 2 (0; t ); so the above argument is complete with respect to Div t . If there is a jump of Div t > 0 in an alternative payout Div t for some t 2 (0; t ); then (39) 
Applying the boundary conditions at H and to determine constants B 5 and B 6 we obtain the expression provided in the proposition.
